Discussion Paper Post-Nordstream 2 Crisis Scenarios

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With the imminent completion of Nordstream 2, the commitment of Germany, the EU, and the United States to resisting Russian efforts to exert political leverage through gas deliveries may be tested as early as this winter.

Already for four months, Russia has limited sales of gas to Europe to levels insufficient for replenishing European gas stocks. The lowest levels are in those storages in Europe that are owned by Gazprom – resulting in an enforced reliance on as-needed sales in the winter months ahead. Thus Russia is already exercising leverage by having reduced gas deliveries to Europe below the level needed for EU markets. Moreover, even if Russia raises gas deliveries to as-needed levels, but engages in new aggression against Ukraine in other areas, it carries an implied threat of reducing gas deliveries if Germany and Europe respond forcefully to such aggression.

With Nordstream 2 completed, there are a great range of potential steps, alone or in combination, that Russia could take to increase pressure on Ukraine while dissuading Europe from action. These range from reducing cross-Ukraine gas transit, to strictly limiting gas flows directly to Germany, to military moves in and around Ukraine, to action against Ukraine’s electric and cyber networks, to political declarations about occupied territories, to parallel actions in Belarus or elsewhere. Russia already claims that its biggest gas refinery in Northern Russia has been damaged by a major fire. 

For Germany, the EU, and the United States, however, there is a very limited toolbox of effective action, beyond condemnatory statements.

The U.S.-German joint statement on Ukraine’s energy security reads, 

This statement aims clearly at sanctions on a German and EU level. The United States is not similarly committed. The sanctions themselves suggest restrictions on Russia energy exports to the EU, which seems questionable as an effective tool, since it may be Russia’s own self-imposed restrictions that trigger such a crisis. Other sanctions in “economically relevant sectors” could be significant, depending on what they are. Minor extensions of existing sanctions would scarcely be noticed in Moscow; tough sanctions restricting Russian access to global financial markets, however, would be something else entirely.

In considering possible actions by Russia that could constitute, using “energy as a weapon,” the West should consider the following scenarios:

• Russia maintains as-needed gas deliveries to Germany/EU, but reduces gas transit across Ukraine – either overtly, or in a deniable manner blaming external events, such as with the 2009 explosion of a Turkmenistan pipeline;

• Same as above, but Russia also insists that Germany/EU not allow gas to Ukraine through European pipelines, or else Russia will reduce supplies to Europe by exactly that amount;

• Russia maintains gas supplies to Germany/EU and maintains transits across Ukraine, while engaging in other hostile activity affecting Ukraine. This could encompass:

• Seizing the Great Crimea Canal from Dnipro in Ukraine that previously supplied water to Crimea;
• Escalating the conflict in Donbas significantly;
• Attempting to seize new territory in Donbas, or isolate/attack Mariupol;
• Closing the Sea of Azov to anything but commercial traffic pre-approved by Russian authorities and delaying the commercial shipping through inspections;
• Seizing Ukrainian hydrocarbon platforms in Ukrainian territorial waters beyond Crimea or Snake Island;
• Export and sale of Ukrainian natural resources seized in Donbas;
• Recognition of “independence” of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples’ Republics;
• Annexation of the so-called Peoples’ Republics; and
• Continued and extended closure of significant areas of the Black Sea due to “military exercises” in ways that impact Ukrainian trade. 

• Russia maintains the status quo with respect to both European gas deliveries and Ukraine transits, but leaves a significant permanent presence in Belarus after Zapad 2021 – possibly to include Russia taking control of the Belarus-Ukraine border.

Any one of these scenarios – and others not stated – is conceivable and could be enacted by Russia within just a few months’ time. Should that occur, what should be the German, EU, U.S., NATO or otherwise “western” response? What would be proportionate and appropriate? What would be effective? What would constitute a successful response? What would be seen as harsh words with no impact?

The questions western leaders need to address – and should be the topics of YES Brainstorming discussion – are as follows: